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Abstract: 
 
This paper, using empirical data from cases of mobilisation in 1996 in Argentina, 
offers new evidence to build on the theory of mobilisation as recently proposed by 
Kelly. The use of injustice as the basis of mobilisation, raises some doubts for both its 
intrinsic subjective nature, and in the light of cases of spontaneous mobilisations. A 
re-formulation of the theory is suggested, less attached to a mechanical sequence and 
more rooted in the contradictions of the capitalist labour process.  
 
Introduction 
 
For those on the left interested in the study of labour, the publication in 1998 of John 
Kelly’s Rethinking industrial relations: mobilisation, collectivism and long waves, 
was finally some water in the desert of industrial relations. After years of sterile 
criticism of the practices of human resource management, Kelly’s work was a return 
to the never forgotten centrality of workers’ collective action and its potentiality 
within the context of capitalist labour relations.  
 
Despite the relevance of the theory, in particular, for the study of industrial conflict 
and trade unions organising, Kelly’s work has rarely been used to analyse concrete 
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cases of mobilisation and it is known more as the, par excellence, Marxist radical 
reference in the pluralist dominated HRM, than as a useful framework for critical 
analysis. However, mobilisation theory inspired works have appeared, in relation to 
leadership (Darlington 2001, Green 2000, Metochi 2001), unions organising (Gall, 
2003, 2000, Kelly and Badigannavar 2005) and injustice (Brown Johnson and Jarley, 
2004). All of these have reached conclusions fundamentally compatible with the main 
assumptions of the theory. 
 
According to the theory of mobilisation, workers have to pass through a certain 
number of psychological/organisational stages before a collective action can 
materialise. Central to this construction are individual perceptions of injustice (that 
something is "wrong" or "illegitimate", Kelly, 1998: 27) which are made explicit and 
framed by leaders attributing these to a specific agent. In this process and following 
this sequence, individual perceptions become collective sharing and thus opens, in the 
presence of a minimum level of organisational resources, the possibility for workers 
to take action collectively. 
  
This research aims to engage constructively with these micro aspects of the theory 
and particularly with the use of injustice, testing Kelly’s model by reconstructing the 
dynamics of mobilisation in two cases that occurred in two car plants in Argentina, 
during 1996.  
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Empirical material shows that mobilization theory does not account for all the cases 
of spontaneous, non-organised action1. Here, the model proposed by Kelly (injustice-
leadership-action), is inverted with leaders and a sense of diffused injustice as ex post 
product of the mobilisation.   
 
This fact has important theoretical implications that form part of the approach taken in 
this paper. Firstly, the paper denies the validity of injustice, in itself a subjective and 
individualistic concept, as the objective basis of mobilisation. Secondly, it places 
leaders as a product emerging from mobilisation rather than as a necessary pre-
condition for mobilisation. Hence, cases of spontaneous collective action put into 
question the overall validity of Kelly’s model. It highlights Kelly’s model as a leader 
centred framework for action which may be useful for unions organising, but which is 
far less useful as a general theory of collective action.  
 
Consequent with these theoretical assumptions and against a view of collective action 
as based on individual injustice, the overall aim of the paper is to reinsert mobilisation 
theory within the sphere of class action by rooting collectivism in the workplace 
solidarity created by the capitalist labour process.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. The first section presents the main theoretical 
concerns with reference Kelly’s use of the concept of injustice and invites a 
reconsideration of collectivism, in the light of the structuring of workplace relations. 
The second section focuses on the methodology used and introduces the cases 
considered.  The third and fourth sections re-evaluate the concerns raised in the 
                                                 
1 In the context of this paper, spontaneous and non-organised are used as synonymous. An ideal 
example of this type of action is Fantasia’s case on ‘the internal dynamics of wild-cat strikes’, Fantasia 
1988, ch.3. 
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theoretical part in the light of the empirical evidence collected. In the last section 
some implications for further research and conclusions are discussed.      
 
Collectivism, injustice and solidarity 
 
According to Kelly, injustice is not just “the sine qua non of collective action” (Kelly 
1998: 27). It “should form the core intellectual agenda for industrial relations” 
(Kelly 1998:126) and, “perceived injustice is the origin of workers’ collective 
definition of interests” (Kelly 1998:64). Thus, it is crucial to ask: what is injustice 
and, should we consider it as adequate to frame workers’ definitions of interests? 
 
The concept of injustice, with its all encompassing and easy to grasp moral value, 
remind us more of the peaceful marches in defence of civil rights, than of the 
employment relationship. Despite the rhetoric of empowerment and job satisfaction, it 
is not a surprise that workers are often the victims of injustices produced by a system 
of power relations in which management right to manage is rarely questioned (Harley, 
1999; Lewchuck and Robertson, 1997) . Their vulnerability to employer’s decisions 
on redundancies, wages, working time, productivity, discipline in the workplace, their 
dependence on capital to survive force them to accept compromises so reproducing 
the dominant system (Lebowitz 2004). Are they simply dissatisfied or do they feel the 
situation as unjust? How does each individual frame his/her sense of injustice? When, 
paraphrasing Barrington Moore (1978), do they move from a sense of inevitability of 
their conditions to a sense of inevitability of action? Who decides the moment in 
which tolerance and acceptance of the compromise with the system is no longer 
sustainable?  
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The use of injustice as the basis of mobilisation is a mistake, especially if our frame of 
reference is that of the conflictual nature of the employment relationship. Once we 
support the view, as Kelly does, that workers and employers have conflicting different 
objective interests, depending on their respective position within the capitalist system, 
we cannot define interests in individual terms through the use of injustice. At the 
same time and for the same reason we cannot think of collective action as the sum of 
individual feelings but rather as “a communicative process within the association of 
workers, whose individual potential to sanction is minimal because of their 
atomization” (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980:79). 
 
How can we think of a general theory of collective action based on a concept that is 
subjectively determined? How this can lead to a collectivist agenda? The overall 
impression, and this may explain Kelly’s over-emphasis on injustice, is that 
mobilisation theory, while aiming to be a generally applicable theory, in reality is not 
more than a framework for action functional for unions organising.  
 
Understanding how workers construct collective identities and interests is very 
complex and it is to Kelly’s merit that he has attempted to create a broad, historical 
and system framed conceptualization of mobilisation.  However, we maintain that to 
understand how workers’ collectivism is created and sustained over time a different 
approach than the one based on injustice is required. We need to go back to the 
contradictions created by the structural nature of the capitalist labour process, a mode 
of production where work is never an individual process despite worker experience to 
the contrary. It is the appearance of individualism, given precedence over the reality 
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of collective participation in the capitalist labour process, which often leads to 
confusion regarding cause and effect (Martinez Lucio and Stewart 1997:53). 
The contradictions created by the capitalist mode of production produce crises both in 
the workplace and in society that give room to moments of collectivisation, those 
necessary processes through which the constant clashes between the manifestation of 
workers’ individual and collective needs may be temporarily solved (Offe and 
Wiesenthal, 1980; Pizzorno, 1981). It is in this context that different patterns of 
collectivism, depending on the establishment of solidarities both within and outside 
the workplace, may be identified, eventually forming the building blocks for a more 
formal strategy of collectivism that can develop into a strategic expression of social 
and cultural resistance (Stephenson and Stewart 2001: 14). Thus, we can argue that 
workers’ collective action on the one hand will always be based on a certain level of 
‘structured’ solidarity, a product of the conflicting nature of the employment 
relationship in capitalist societies, and on the other hand will always be entangled 
within a complex structure of power relations within both the workplace and society.  
 
By rooting the existence of collectivism and solidarity in these contradictions we are 
able to account for all those cases of spontaneous, unorganised mobilisations that the 
action of a leadership or a sense of injustice cannot explain. Further, we are not forced 
to look at mobilisation as necessarily based on the existence of empirically tested pre-
conditions but rather as something in ‘the making’ (Fantasia 1988, 1995). At the same 
time, rooting mobilisation in the contradictions that the labour-capital relation 
constantly recreates is crucial in understanding variations in the historical and 
international level of labour unrest (Silver 2003).   
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In conclusion we can say, especially in a militant/organising perspective, that 
emphasising the importance of moments of collectivism, the ‘cultures of solidarity’ 
these create, their linkages with the cultural and social milieu and their different 
patterns in the construction of collective action, is fundamental to give substance and 
consistency to any effort of mobilising workers. Focusing on these moments also 
helps to clearly identify all capital’s counter-mobilizing attempts. Thus, far from 
offering a clear, fixed and linear way of thinking about collective action we should be 
able to express its complexity and dynamics.  
 
Considering this theoretical background, the empirical material has been organised 
with two aims in mind: a) to show that mobilization can occur for reasons not directly 
depending on individuals’ senses of injustice or leaders persuasive action and b) to 
provide a map of the developments and involutions in the process of collectivisation 
and solidarity formation.  
 
Methodology  
 
This paper is based on fieldwork conducted in the city of Córdoba, Argentina, in 
2002/2003 on two factory occupations that occurred in 1996 in the FIAT and Renault 
car plants. The events investigated were very specific. Not all the workers necessarily 
participated in the mobilisations or in all the phases of these. Thus, instead of 
selecting the interviewees using a random sample, a method of systematic 
diversification has been adopted (generations, working position, union’s affiliation) in 
both cases. At the same time, interviewees were selected having in mind their level of 
participation in the conflict so to form four main opinion groups: managers, less 
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militant workers (often workers still employed by the companies), the more militant 
(activists) and the heterogeneous. Sixty qualitative in-depth and semi-structured 
interviews were collected in total.  
 
There were six years gap between the events and the research and often workers that 
participated in the mobilisations were difficult to find as they were employed in other 
sectors and/or did not want to talk. However this has not created problems but rather 
advantages in terms of methodology. The time gap, forcing people to remember, has 
in fact favoured a more clear and focused reconstruction of the events.  
 
The aim of the fieldwork was to get primary data on concrete events of mobilisation 
and, analysing their dynamics, compare this with the model offered by the theory of 
mobilisation. This, in particular, meant a search for injustice, this being, according to 
Kelly, the conditio sine qua non for mobilisation. In this process I found so many 
different types of injustice. This suggested the need to look for a different, structurally 
rooted, basis of collective action.      
 
Following the aims of the research, the dialogue with the interviewees went through 
the following issues: workers and their relations with the employer, workers and the 
socio-political environment, workers and the union, workers, leadership and activism, 
workers and the dynamics of mobilisation, managers and the dynamics of 
mobilisation. 
 
In addition, the validity of the data has been strengthened also by the use of 
documentary data. For the case of FIAT, the company's internal reports, security 
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videos and press conferences have offered a different point of view of the event and 
more clarity on the strategy pursued by management during mobilisation and counter 
mobilisation. Archives of the local newspaper and of the university's television 
channel have also been scanned for items at the time of conflict.  
 
The research context 
 
During the 1990s, Argentina was considered as one of the most virtuous examples in 
the implementation of the so called structural adjustments, inspired by the dominant 
neo-liberal visions of economy promoted by international financial institutions. The 
fictitious parity between peso and dollar benefited foreign investment but depressed 
local business and produced unemployment. Public companies were privatised and 
thousands of workers made redundant in this process (Thwaites Rey, 1999). Reforms 
inspired by the flexible use of labour were introduced in the labour law (Battistini and 
Montes Cato’, 2000). The consequences of these destabilising policies produced a 
consistent, although disorganised, number of struggles at local and national level 
against both the employer and, often, collaborationist trade unions.  
 
Trade unions in Argentina, because of their fundamental role as mass organisers and 
political support for the Peronist movement, have a very high level of politicisation. 
They have a vertical structure with centralised power (financial and political) and 
personified by a leader who is, most of the time, politically tied to the leadership of 
the Partido Justicialista (the party form of the Peronist movement). This particular 
relation with political power made trade unions’ action extremely contradictory, 
especially when they had to support government’s decisions openly against the people 
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they were supposed to represent (Martuccelli and Svampa, 1997). This is what 
happened during the double presidency of Menem in the 1990s. Trapped between the 
loyalty to a Peronist president, whose reforms were eroding workers’ rights, and a 
growing grassroots movement, trade unions were successful in the control of 
mobilisations (like in the case of Renault) or were bypassed by workers’ spontaneous 
action (like in the case of FIAT). 
 
As a consequence of the politicisation of the majority of the Argentinean trade unions 
(to have the power of legally representing its members, a trade union needs an official 
authorisation granted by the Ministry of Labour), workers have often mobilised 
outside the union channel as a reaction against both the employer and the trade union. 
This, together with companies’ approach to conflict, is fundamental to identify 
differences between the two cases of mobilisation.      
 
In 1996 FIAT was in the process of upgrading its engine with a new assembly plant. 
This decision to increase its investment in Argentina was creating expectations among 
the workers in the engine factory. These were people with apathy in relation to 
conflict, fully engaged by the company’s paternalism, with a high level of income, 
especially compared with the rest of workers in the country, with expectations of 
growth in their careers within the company and in society as well. The objective 
reality they were facing before the conflict was that of security and stability.  
 
Mobilisation exploded unexpectedly when management decided, all of a sudden, to 
force workers to sign a new flexible contract with a drastic salary reduction. As a 
consequence, workers occupied the factory out of trade union control and without any 
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recognised leaders. The same people that for years had maintained themselves in the 
comforts of the island of welfare their employment could offer changed with the new 
conditions they had to face. The situation and the action that followed it forged the 
process through which compañerismo (a fair relation with their fellows workers in the 
same line) became active solidarity. This produced a radicalisation of conflict and the 
establishment of a permanent state of open confrontation and adversarial relations 
between management and new, democratically elected, workers' representative. 
 
In the case of Renault as well workers had to face the implementation of a set of 
“flexible” measures that negatively affected their previous working and salary 
conditions. But while in the case of FIAT these changes were introduced abruptly and 
unleashed strong mobilisation out of union and company control, in the case of 
Renault, workers experienced a prolonged deterioration of their conditions. The 
workforce was reduced selectively and with the use of incentive schemes. Entire 
sections were outsourced to external companies with new employment conditions for 
those workers that could maintain their posts. In a few years, Renault in complicity 
with the business union SMATA, effectively introduced all the organisational changes 
necessary to make the company more profitable. This strategy helped to keep conflict 
under control. Workers did mobilise to occupy the plant, and genuinely supported an 
oppositional and more militant stance within the union, but the divisions among them 
provoked by company strategy and the unsuccessful attempt to win control of the 
union, broke solidarity and any possibility of conflict radicalisation.    
 
Summarising, if we want to establish differences between the two cases we could 
consider companies’ strategy and trade unions’ control of mobilisations as those 
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factors whose material presence or absence has hampered or facilitated mobilisation. 
However, the identification of these causes may explain the specific cases analysed 
but this is not necessarily true in all the cases.  
 
What has more theoretical consequences is that at FIAT the contemporary absence of 
a clear company strategy and a trade union control of workers’ reactions to the 
introduction of the new contract produced a vacuum of power. In this context, 
momentarily free of obstacles, workers reframed their process of mobilisation in and 
through the struggle. The case of FIAT is the one that, by inverting Kelly’s model of 
mobilisation, ask us to search for an alternative model. 
 
 Findings: 
 
a) Workers' injustices 
 
FIAT's workers occupied their factory unexpectedly, after more than 20 years of 
passivity, forced to this by a drastic reduction of salaries imposed unilaterally by the 
company. The conflict changed the lives of many and their unconditional 
identification with the company.  
 
“We were all wearing the FIAT shirt. When I was ordered: “do this or do that”, I 
have always executed the order, I have always complied with the obligations of my 
work. We were very happy with the situation we were living and  we were interested 
in the productivity of the plant.” (FIAT worker 31). 
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After they signed to the new, pejorative, contract and in the nightly discussions with 
their families, workers were trying to define their sensations and to give an 
explanation of the situation in which they were living: 
 
“the change of contract broke an entire life project, it destroyed myself and my family, 
I could not accept that idea” (workers’ delegate), “you were feeling as though 
someone had robbed you, it is like when you buy a toy for a kid and when you are 
going to give him, and the kid with all the hope to play, you tell him “it was not for 
you it was for someone else” (workers’ delegate). “In that plant people always 
worked a lot, production rhythms were very high. People worked a lot but they were 
proud to be employed by that company. The company did not recognise this and 
people felt betrayed, injured” (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
 
Workers felt hit for many reasons: because they were working more and earning less, 
because they felt betrayed by the company, because a life project was at risk, because 
their "island" of welfare was submerged by the "sea" of unemployment and flexibility 
surrounding their plant. Each worker had his/her own reasons to feel the situation as 
unjust. Renault's workers in the meantime were not mobilising but were suffering 
suspensions, selective lay offs and intensification of work. Did they feel all this as 
unjust? Consider the following quotations: 
 
 “we were all aware, all…..unfortunately how many “broncas” (anger, regrets, 
sorrow) we had to accept? Thousands and thousands of “broncas”. You have to hold 
out and accept it for the family, you have to tolerate many things” (Renault worker 
12). “You were surrounded with no possibility to move, you had to stay in the middle. 
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Everybody felt fear, fear to lose the job, fear of the government, fear of the enterprise, 
fear of the union. Fear, fear, fear” (Renault worker 1). 
 
At this stage of analysis, despite the evidence that before mobilisation workers may 
have individually felt a sense of injustice (although for not coincident reasons and this 
confirms how different and eventually conflicting may be workers’ interests once 
considered from an individual point of view), collectively they did not share it yet.  
 
The problems in considering injustice as the basis of mobilisation appeared again 
while interviewing people who, six years after the conflict and despite economic 
crises, were still working in the FIAT plant and who experienced those moments of 
mobilisation. These kinds of people maintained the strongest affective relation with 
the company. In their view, there was no injustice in the decision to cut their salaries. 
Nobody was of course happy about the changed situation but individually they came 
to accept and justify the new labour conditions.  
 
“You have to be realist and always stay on the side of the enterprise. You have to be 
fully aware that an enterprise pays a salary for the work that a person does and you 
have to agree with that working condition. I have always been on that side, if I do not 
like it I do not stay. But if in that moment I was staying behind a machine, doing the 
same and earning less than before, I could not tell you what I could have done” 
(FIAT manager personnel office, former production worker). 
 
Others stressed the view that their sacrifice was justified by the fact that young 
workers were now entering the plant and that was an important social development 
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for the entire community. The majority of them accepted because of the responsibility 
they had for the family  
 
“I have a family, I cannot say “well I give up the job” if there is no other option. 
(FIAT worker 1). 
 
Generally it appeared that working in the plant was somehow addictive for those 
people who had already spent a number of years in the factory, which applied both to 
FIAT and Renault workers. The production rhythms, a certain stability and social 
recognition achieved during the years, the repetitiveness of a life structured around 
the plant, the development of inflexible skills adapted specifically to the production of 
parts of cars, created in many people, including those who initially mobilised, a sort 
of dependency on the factory.  
 
“The point is that those people that have passed, in practice, a life inside the factory 
maybe do not see things as one who has thought to leave the factory. A person that 
lived inside there, when he goes from the plant to the street looking for a job,  does 
not even know how to sell something. He structured his life working there and if you 
send him to the corner to sell a “Mantecol”, (popular biscuit frequently sold in street 
kiosks) he does not know how to do it” (workers’delegate). 
 
Although individually workers may perceive a specific situation as unjust, their sense 
of injustice and their possible reactions tend to remain blocked between structural 
constraints (they simply need to maintain the job because no alternative options are 
offered, because of the responsibilities of the family, and because of the non 
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adaptability to a working life outside the factory) and the impossibility of identifying 
a collective agent.  
 
The day of the factory occupation, which also corresponded to the beginning of 
mobilisation, workers were of course feeling uncomfortable with the unexpected 
decision of the company to change their contract but they did not know what to do. 
The union delegates disappeared. For the company a normal day of work was starting. 
There were no recognised leaders, there was no organisation, and nobody knew what 
to do. People started to work but only for a few hours. 
 
“The day after we entered the plant and we found a very strange situation, a very 
strange atmosphere. People meeting together in all the corners, everybody was 
meeting, it was like the day could not start. We reached the changing room but we did 
not even change. “A mate is saying that we have to gather”. And it was something 
instantaneous. We went forward to the small square in front of the plant, none of the 
union delegates was there, “this is not what they had told us… somebody that could 
explain… let’s go to ask for explanations, let’s go and demand some explanations”. 
And people went out of the plant in order, I think everybody was there and they went 
walking forward, “What is happening?” (FIAT worker, Quality Control Department). 
 
‘A debate started, in the whole plant there were discussions. After this a movement 
started to grow, they started to mobilise. They had no idea of where to go and what to 
do but nonetheless they started to gather, they were many, and then an internal 
mobilisation of the plant, without leaders, started to emerge’ (FIAT Industrial 
Relations Director).  
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‘The day after they reached the plant feeling bad, a collective bad feeling and without 
anybody suggesting anything to them, they got together. What should we do?’ (FIAT 
mobilisation leader). 
 
The factory occupation was spontaneous, unplanned, not organised. FIAT workers 
were not used to mobilisation and in the previous years they had just participated in a 
few national strikes because they were under pressure from the union that was 
formally representing them. People were used to solving working problems directly 
with the foreman and individually each of them had already accepted the conditions 
of the new contract. Even if the majority did not like it, nonetheless they had to accept 
it. It is just when they met again at work that mobilisation started and with it their 
perceptions of injustice became explicit. Workers started to talk, became conscious of 
what was happening, solidarity emerged within the workplace, natural leaders unified 
individual sensations. From individual rebellion and discussions among groups of 
workers the wave grew and people occupied the plant not knowing what they were 
doing apart from the fact that they needed to understand what was happening. 
Somebody violently closed the factory gate and the mobilisation became an 
occupation. 
 
Summarising from this empirical evidence, injustice is not just subjective and thus 
difficult to theorise. It also tends to be framed by the action itself rather than 
constituting the conditio sine qua non of mobilisation. Workers become conscious of 
how “unjust” a certain situation is once action has already started, once collectively 
they can share and strengthen the same perceptions. This is a founding moment of 
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mobilisation because it gives concrete collective meaning to what was previously a set 
of individual perceptions of injustice. There are no mechanical, predetermined 
movements from injustice to mobilisation but it is the status of mobilisation, the 
action in itself, that allows a “conscious” injustice and consequently an operative and 
cohesive function of it within the whole process of mobilisation. This does not 
necessarily mean that without collective action injustice does not exist at all. The 
feeling can be to different degrees perceived but is dominated by the acceptance of the 
inevitable and the actor has already processed the changed situation and has accepted 
it, willingly or not. Thus workers may individually perceive injustice but their 
mobilisation will always remain a mere possibility if there is no space left for 
moments of collectivisation where solidarity can be activated. 
 
These conclusions may depict a situation common to other cases of spontaneous 
mobilisations or instead represent just one of the possible outcomes. More research is 
certainly needed. Yet if we think of more “traditional” cases of leaders promoting 
mobilisation, for which more consistent research is available, we cannot avoid 
considering these are based on the same principle. Leaders will not be able to activate 
and sustain a mobilisation without a reframing of workers’ interests in collective 
terms. Thus they will need to create and defend the space for reciprocal support and 
solidarity. 
 
b) The process of collectivisation and solidarity formation 
 
Following our theoretical position, the contradictions produced by the capitalist 
labour process often in combination with a favourable political and cultural climate, 
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creates the room for moments of collectivisation, largely based on solidarity. Thus is 
this section we aim to provide an empirical mapping of the process of solidarity 
formation.   
 
In the case of FIAT we have a heterogeneous group of workers that in the 20 years 
before the conflict never had a confrontation with the enterprise, were proud of the 
quality of their work, were totally identified with the company, were part of the 
workers' aristocracy, already had a place in the society and future plans of social and 
professional ascent:  
 
“People were not so much concerned with solidarity……nobody wanted to lose 
anything because we had, compared with workers nationally, a good salary and a 
comfortable position… but we were losing what was in our common interests” (FIAT 
worker quality department). 
 
Before the conflict there was compañerismo among workers. As people working in 
the same environment they considered themselves as colleagues. There was a natural 
empathy among them reinforced by the common sharing of social activities related to 
the work in the plant (football tournaments, social events organised by the company 
for the workers’ families). 
 
“at that time everything was quiet, we were earning very well and the rest was not 
important. Among us there was compañerismo, there were always parties, there were 
always people for this but not for the struggle” (FIAT activist 4). 
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In the plant it was difficult to organise even a small protest for better food in the 
cafeteria and solidarity was not emerging because workers had no important 
complaints with the company, thus no interest in raising conflict.  
 
“there was high production, we had to work extra time, the company needed workers  
because it was a high peak moment in the automotive production in Argentina. There 
was no pressure from the company, they rather always tried to respect the rules of the 
collective agreement that we had at that time” (FIAT activist 1) 
 
But as a consequence of the events that led to mobilisation, compañerismo 
transformed itself into solidarity:  
 
“there was compañerismo and nothing else. That is why the day of the factory 
occupation people were crying…….. It was a situation for crying because…… 
solidarity, everything was unexpected, it was like something was set free, was 
released and this was positive for the people” (FIAT mobilisation leader). 
 
Solidarity was released, was set free and workers grouped together as an almost 
instinctive reaction to the drastic change of contract: 
 
“we went directly to clash and it wasn’t, they forced you because a different solution 
was not available, they forced you to give that clash. They made it (the change of 
contract) so compulsive and the salary reduction so drastic that it resulted in a very 
strong blow and you had to replay it with another strong stroke, no alternative was 
left" (FIAT worker 32) 
 21
 
Solidarity was emerging spontaneously even among a group of persons not used to 
conflict because there was no basis any more to support individualism. The 
paternalistic style used for decades by the company to control the labour force, the 
“golden splendour” of the isolation from the rest of the working class, bureaucratic 
unionism, all disappeared from one day to the other. In this new situation, without 
those elements that had maintained workers out of conflict for decades, new rooms for 
collectivization were created and solidarity became the basis of workers’ strength. In 
that moment people started to achieve a deeper consciousness of their position within 
the more general social unrest of the country and this contributed to the radicalisation 
of their fight.  
 
The issue of solidarity most explicitly appeared in the interviews with FIAT workers. 
If in this latter case they have experienced a sort of “progressive”, “increasing” sense 
in the strength of their solidarity, Renault workers have, by contrast, experienced a 
“regression” and their accounts appear full of scepticism. Both the company and the 
bureaucratic union contributed to this:  
 
“The politics of the enterprise has always been to divide us if they suspected that we 
could gather and build solidarity among us. They tried to create conflict and divisions 
among us……..I tell you once again, the one who loses is always the worker, I do not 
know if because of our lack of activity or because of their plan” (Renault worker 8). 
 
“Many people say that in reality the union and the company arrange things among 
themselves but then say to people different things. It seems that it is like this because 
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we didn’t gain anything. We were feeling impotent and we couldn’t even look for a 
different solution, with different people representing us because the union didn’t 
allow us to do it” (Renault Worker 7). 
 
“the company contributes to breaking the solidarity, I think. This was or it is what the 
company normally does, to break the unity among colleagues, we lived all this down 
there, I’m sure” (Renault worker 4). 
 
Despite attempts to build an internal opposition to challenge both the bureaucratic 
union leadership and the strategy of the company, solidarity could not find room for 
its development, former opposition delegates were co-opted to the union apparatus 
and the process of outsourcing and de-localisation of entire company departments 
negated any possibility of future mobilisations.   
 
By favouring an approach to solidarity as the active, dynamic component of each 
process of collectivisation we can explain those cases, like the one at FIAT, in which 
despite the non existence of favourable preconditions (for instance class 
consciousness, previous organisation) this was not an obstacle for people to mobilise. 
The case of Renault is the mirror of that of FIAT in the sense of reflecting the same 
but inverted image. In the first case the sudden mobilisation provoked a simultaneous 
collapse of the factors (company’s paternalism, a diffused individualism, a 
bureaucratic form of unionism) that for years constrained the development of active 
solidarity. In the second case the same factors maintained the status quo thus 
hampering any attempt to build collective action.  
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Conclusions 
 
The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its 
own making (E.P.Thompson 1980:8). 
 
A radical labour account of collectivism needs a certain level of abstraction and 
rejects empiricist obsessions if it aims to avoid both the tautology of contingent views 
of collective action (that workers mobilise in different ways under different 
conditions) and the morality and individualisation attached to the concept of injustice. 
The logic inspiring this paper has been to look at collective action as rooted in the 
contradictions and crisis generated by the capitalist labour process. These are the 
moments in which a taken for granted system and set of values (for instance 
management’s right to manage, authority relations, bureaucratic control) is contested 
and new spaces are created for workers’ interests’ collectivisation. These are also the 
moments that show how the participative and collective nature of work can generate 
solidarity which in turn becomes central to attempts to organise workers.  
 
Based on this theoretical starting point, first the inconsistency of injustice and then the 
process of collectivisation and solidarity formation have been empirically proven, 
always trying to offer an image of movement, of social processes in the making. The 
adoption of this methodological approach is crucial to explain the complex dynamics 
of processes of collectivisation. At the same time it is the best antidote to any 
empirically obsessed reconstruction of social reality.  
 
 24
By criticising the subjective nature of injustice and stressing the importance of labour 
process generated solidarity, this article has contributed to a conceptualisation of 
mobilisation as fully inserted in the sphere of class action. Kelly’s contribution 
remains very important as it is certainly a useful tool for trade unions’ and leaders’ 
action.  However a more structurally grounded conceptualisation is needed. This 
paper has tried to engage with it and in doing so it may have reinforced Kelly’s 
overall vision of the theory as framed by a Marxist logic of society and economy. 
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